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Nontechnical Summary
This paper investigates the implications of U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol on
environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, and the distribution of compliance costs for
remaining Annex-B countries taking into consideration the monopoly power by the Former
Soviet Union (FSU) on international emission permit markets. Based on a multi-region partial
equilibrium framework of marginal carbon abatement cost curves, we find that U.S.
withdrawal considerably alters the environmental and economic implications of FSU market
power in permit trade. Under U.S. compliance, monopolistic permit by FSU has no impact on
environmental effectiveness as compared to a competitive trading system. Aggregate
emissions of Annex-B regions fall by 10 % below business-as-usual emission levels. Excess
costs of market power amount to 40 % of total compliance costs under competitive permit
markets. Under U.S. withdrawal, monopolistic permit supply on behalf of the Former Soviet
Union will assure some environmental effects of the Kyoto Protocol, with aggregate Annex-B
emissions (including U.S.) falling by 3 % vis-à-vis the business-as-usual emission level. For
competitive permit trade, environmental effectiveness would be reduced to zero since the U.S.
withdrawal implies an excess supply of permits driving permit prices down to zero. Efficiency
losses from monopoly behavior by FSU under U.S. withdrawal double total compliance costs
compared to a competitive permit market system which achieves the same environmental
target. Given FSU monopoly power, U.S. withdrawal provides some cost reduction to
complying non-U.S. OECD countries because reduced overall permit demand drives down the
permit price. On the other hand, FSU and its competitive fringe EEC must bear a larger
decline in revenues from permit sales. 
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Abstract
This paper investigates the implications of U.S. withdrawal on environmental effectiveness,
economic efficiency, and the distribution of compliance costs taking into account market
power of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) on emission permit markets. While exercise of
market power on behalf of FSU under U.S. compliance has no environmental impact as
compared to competitive permit trade, it prevents the Kyoto Protocol from boiling down to
business-as-usual after U.S. withdrawal. Non-compliance of the U.S. increases the efficiency
losses from FSU market power and reduces the compliance costs of remaining OECD
countries but these gains must be weighted against a dramatic loss in overall environmental
effectiveness. Clearly, the big losers from U.S. withdrawal are FSU and its competitive fringe
(Central and Eastern Europe) that suffer from a huge decline in permit sales revenues.
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11. Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in December 1997, has been celebrated as a
breakthrough in international climate policy (Oberthür and Ott 2000). This treaty specifies
quantified reduction targets for a basket of six major greenhouse gases (GHG) across
industrialized countries as listed in Annex-B of the Protocol. Signatories must verify
fulfillment of their duties during the commitment period 2008-2012. In its original version,
the Protocol entails a reduction of GHG emissions for Annex-B countries by 5.2 % on
average below their aggregate 1990 emission level.1
One very contentious issue on the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol has been the
degree to which emissions reduction commitments by individual Annex-B countries can be
met through additional abatement in other Annex-B countries using tradable emission
permits. The claim for unrestricted emissions trading follows from overall cost-efficiency
considerations: Total costs of achieving the overall Annex-B abatement target will be lowest
when marginal abatement costs across different emission sources are equalized under free
competitive trade. However, there have been major concerns that unrestricted Annex-B
emissions trading will allow transitional economies of Eastern Europe (EEC) and the former
Soviet Union (FSU) to sell "excess" emission rights (i.e. rights that they would not use in the
case of strictly domestic abatement). These excess emissions are referred to as "hot air" and
stem from the fact that EEC and particularly FSU have been conceded emission entitlements
under the Kyoto Protocol that appear to be well in excess of their anticipated emissions (as a
result of the economic turndown during the transition to market economies). Under emissions
trading, these parties can sell hot air virtually at no costs to itself, providing large economic
benefits, especially to FSU (see e.g. Weyant 1999). Obviously, hot air decreases the
environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol vis-à-vis strictly domestic action. With
respect to 2010, estimates for hot air from EEC and FSU range up to 500 millions of tons of
carbon (MtC), whereas the other signatory countries are expected to reduce their emissions by
a total of 800-900 MtC compared to business-as-usual (BaU) (Paltsev 2000). Proposals for a
ceiling on emission trading have been put forward by the EU in order to reduce hot air and,
thus, achieve lower total world emissions as compared to unrestricted emissions trading
(UNFCCC 1999). The imposition of supply and demand side restrictions to permit trading
                                                
1 Due to lack of appropriate data for non-CO2 gases, most studies focus on the analysis of CO2, which is by far
the most important greenhouse gas for industrialized countries. The usual approach is to apply reduction
targets referring to the basket of six GHG to CO2 only. We proceed in a like manner within the current paper.
2under the EU proposal has triggered an extensive analysis on the associated economic and
environmental impacts (Baron et al. 1999, Bernstein et al. 1999, Böhringer 2000, Bollen et al.
1999, Criqui et al. 1999, Ellermann and Wing 2000, Paltsev 2000). It has been pointed out
that these restrictions have similar effects as market power on behalf of dominant permit
buyers (monopoly/oligopoly) or sellers (monopsony/oligopsony)2: Permit price manipulation
results in additional overall economic costs to achieve the same level of abatement as under
perfect competition with a redistribution of permit trade gains from buyers to sellers (in the
case of monopoly/oligopoly) or from sellers to buyers (in the case of monopsony/oligopsony).
Institutional restrictions to permit trading as lanced by the EU have been supported neither by
the FSU (for obvious reasons) nor by the USA, which has strongly opposed any emissions
trading restrictions on the exploitation of the full efficiency gains. Without the major polluters
USA and FSU, however, the Protocol can not be put into force.3 Monopolistic supply
behavior, on the other hand, seems a realistic assumption given the small number of sellers in
the Annex B market, namely EEC and, particularly, the FSU.
This paper investigates the implications of U.S. withdrawal on environmental
effectiveness, economic efficiency, and the distribution of compliance costs taking into
account the exercise of FSU monopoly power on permit markets. Based on a multi-region
partial equilibrium framework of marginal carbon abatement cost curves generated by the
POLES world energy model (Criqui et al. 1996), we find that U.S. withdrawal considerably
alters the environmental and economic implications of FSU market power in permit trade:
(i) Under U.S. compliance, monopolistic permit by FSU has no impact on environmental
effectiveness as compared to a competitive trading system. Aggregate emissions of
Annex-B regions fall by 10 % below business-as-usual emission levels. Excess costs
of market power amount to 40 % of total compliance costs under competitive permit
markets. 
                                                
2
 As noted in Ellermann and Wing (2000) with respect to demand side restrictions: "Monopsonistic effects
require only that demand be restricted, not that the restriction be optimal in any sense. Also, effects occur
with price-taking behavior by both buyers and sellers so long as an effective coordinating or restraining
mechanism is in place."
3
 The Protocol will not be put into force until it has been ratified by at least 55 countries, and these ratifying
countries must have contributed at least 55 percent of the industrialized world's CO2 emissions (the most
important GHG) in 1990.
3(ii) Under U.S. withdrawal, monopolistic permit supply on behalf of the Former Soviet
Union will assure some environmental effects of the Kyoto Protocol with aggregate
Annex-B emissions (including U.S.) falling by 3 % vis-à-vis the business-as-usual
emission level. For competitive permit trade, environmental effectiveness would be
reduced to zero since the U.S. withdrawal implies an excess supply of permits, driving
permit prices down to zero.4 Efficiency losses from monopoly behavior by FSU in the
case of U.S. withdrawal double the total compliance costs compared to a competitive
permit market system which achieves the same environmental target.
(iii) Given FSU monopoly power, U.S. withdrawal provides some cost reduction to
complying non-U.S. OECD countries because reduced overall permit demand drives
down the permit price.5 On the other hand, FSU and its competitive fringe EEC must
bear a larger decline in revenues from permit sales. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the effective
emission constraints for Annex-B regions (including sink credits) and lays out our basic
reasoning on the potential for supply-side market power. Section 3 entails a description of the
analytical framework to study the effects of non-competitive permit supply behavior under the
new provisions of the Kyoto Protocol. Section 4 describes our policy simulations. Section 5
concludes.
2. Emission Constraints and Market Power 
A. Emission Constraints
Table 1 lists historical GHG emissions for 1990 and projected emissions for 2010
across Annex-B regions. Furthermore, it contains the nominal percentage reduction
commitment with respect to 1990 as well as the effective percentage reduction commitment
with respect to 2010 for both the initial amendments of Kyoto (columns Old) and the Bonn
updates (columns New). The latter are based on preliminary estimates for sink credits by the
                                                
4
 Kyoto, thus, would boil down to business-as-usual without any real abatement.
5
 Given a decrease in environmental effectiveness by a factor of more than three, one should be cautious about
interpreting such a cost reduction as an effective welfare gain.
4European Commission as listed in Appendix B. The last column of Table 1 reports the
cutback requirements of the New regime in absolute terms.
6
 
We see that all OECD countries are expected to have substantially higher emissions in
2010
7
 since their economic growth is linked to higher fossil fuel consumption. On the other
hand, EEC and, in particular, FSU, have emissions well below 1990 levels as a result of a
sharp decline in economic activity during the 90ies that will not be offset by the projected
economic recovery of these regions between 2000-2010. In short, compliance to the Kyoto
Protocol implies a drastic reduction in business-as-usual emissions for OECD countries even
under sink credits, whereas the scope of hot air for FSU and EEC increases further.
The official DOE projections for 2010 (DOE 2001), combined with the revised Kyoto
targets (New), suggest a hot air volume of 302 MtC for FSU and 59 MtC for EEC,
respectively. Accounting for the U.S. withdrawal from the Protocol, the figures on absolute
cutback requirements in Table 1 indicate an excess supply of hot air of 78 MtC. If emission
rights were fully tradable across Annex-B regions, competitive permit markets would drive
down the international permit price to zero such that no emission reduction at all would occur
with respect to business-as-usual.8
Paltsev (2000) has noted that, due to the variability of growth numbers in the gross
domestic product for FSU, the projected amount of hot air may vary to some extent across
different data sources. Lower estimates for hot air may prevent an excess supply of permits
and thus competitive permit prices from falling to zero in the case of U.S. withdrawal.
However, our simulations on supply-side restrictions in section 4 confirm robustness of
quantitative results with respect to larger deductions in hot air. The reason is that
monopolistic permit supply will be smaller than the lower bound estimates for hot air in any
case.
                                                
6
 The aggregation of individual Annex-B countries is based on the data available from the POLES model.
7
 In our comparative-static analysis, we refer to the commitment period in terms of a representative target year
2010. 
8
 It has been agreed that the use of emissions trading "shall be supplemental to domestic action and domestic
action shall thus constitute a significant element of the effort made by each Party .... to meet its quantified
emission limitation and reduction commitments ..." (UNFCCC 2001). The undefined term "significant" gives
sufficient leeway for comprehensive trading. The restrictive position by the EU with respect to the
permissible scope of emissions trading between industrialized countries has not been held up since the Bonn
conference. There are no concrete caps on the share of emissions reductions a country can meet through the
5Table 1: Baseline emissions, percentage reduction, absolute cutbacks
Region Baseline
Emissions
(MtC)a
Nominal
Reduction
(% wrt 1990)b
Effective
Reduction
(% wrt 2010)
Absolute
Cutback
(MtC wrt 2010)
1990 2010 Old New Old New Old New
AUN 88 130 -6.8 -10.2 27.7 25.4 36 33
CAN 126 165 6.0 -7.9 28.2 17.6 47 29
EUR 930 1040 7.8 5.2 17.5 15.2 182 158
JPN 269 330 6.0 0.8 23.4 19.1 77 63
EEC 279 209 7.1 3.9 -24.0 -28.3 -50 -59
FSU 853 593 0 -4.9 -43.8 -50.9 -260 -302
Total US outc 2545 2467 4.3 0 1.3 -3.2 32 -78
USA 1345 1809 7.0 3.2 30.9 28.0 558 507
Total US ind 3890 4276 5.2 1.1 13.8 10.0 590 429
Key: AUN – Australia and New Zealand, CAN – Canada, EUR - OECD Europe (incl. EFTA), 
JPN – Japan, EEC - Central and Eastern Europe, FSU - Former Soviet Union (incl. Ukraine).
a Based on DOE reference case (DOE 2001)
b Estimates by the EU Commission based on UNFCC (http://www.unfccc.int) 
c Annex-B without U.S. compliance
d Annex-B with U.S. compliance
B. Market Power
The issue of market power in tradable quota markets has been subject to extensive
theoretical and empirical research that includes Hahn (1984), Sartzetakis (1997), Ellerman
and Decaux (1998), Ellerman et al. (1998), Misiolek and Elder (1989), Malueg (1990),
Westkog (1996 and 2001), Burniaux (1998), and Godby (2000). Either dominant buyers
(monopsony or oligopsony) or sellers (monopoly or oligopoly) may be able to exert market
power in the permit market or use their market power in the permit market to gain power in
the product market. In the following, market power refers only to the capacity to influence the
market price of traded permits (so-called “cost minimizing manipulation”).
Market power in emissions trading results in reduced demand in the case of a
monopsony or reduced supply in the case of a monopoly. A monopsonist may thereby force
the permit price below a monopolist above the competitive level. Thus, the extent of
competition in a tradable permit market affects the efficiency of international permit trade and
                                                                                                                                                        
purchase of permits from other industrialized countries, nor are there caps on the amount of permits it can
sell.
6the degree to which potential cost savings are realized. Permit price manipulations result in
additional overall economic costs to achieve the same level of abatement as under perfect
competition.
There has been some discussion whether market power on international permit
markets will be an issue under the Kyoto Protocol. In general, the likelihood of market power
increases if the number of participants is smaller or if the size of some participants is larger
than neo-classical firm-to-firm trading with many participants (Woerdman 2000). Article 17
of the Kyoto Protocol creates an intergovernmental emissions trading market next to or
instead of firm trading, so it is uncertain whether firms or governments will participate in
international emissions trading. In the case of firm-to-firm trading, the scope for market
power seems rather limited. However, it seem very unlikely that the FSU, as the dominant
supplier of emission rights9, will give up on market power by leaving permit trade to its
domestic firms (whose entitlements with carbon rights are unclear anyway). On the demand
side, competitive behavior seems to be the appropriate assumption. The reason is that either
firms of OECD countries may be allowed to engage in emissions trading directly10, or - under
the assumption of Party-to-Party trading - coordination of several individual OECD countries
within a demand cartel seems rather difficult. 
Figure 1 illustrates the effects of supply-side restrictions accounting for the excess
supply of hot air. Under perfect competition, unrestricted (see index “u” in Figure 1) hot air
supply of EEC and FSU exceed aggregate permit demand by non-U.S. OECD countries; the
permit market price will drop to zero (Pu) and the quantity of hot air permits traded equals the
total abatement requirement of non-U.S. regions (Qu). Consequently, there will be no
domestic emissions abatement of permit importers (here: non-U.S. OECD countries) with
respect to business-as-usual emission levels  e , and total revenues for permit exporting
countries (here: EEC and FSU) equal zero. Quantity restrictions Sr (see index “r” in Figure 1),
which reduce the supply of hot air below the total abatement requirement Qu, drive up the
market price of permits by P from Pu to Pr. Total permit trade is, then, reduced from Qu to Qr
and effective total emission abatement amounts to Q. Apart from increased environmental
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FSU holds 84 % of total hot air, which exceeds market demand for any given price level (see Table 1 and
Figure 2). 
10
 See e.g. the plans of the EU commission to implement an EU internal trading system starting in 2005 with
firm-to-firm trading across energy-intensive industries (see Böhringer 2001).
7effectiveness, the exercise of monopoly power entails a redistribution of the gains from permit
trade from buyers to sellers and a loss of economic efficiency, because marginal abatement
costs (C’) are no longer equalized across regions. In comparison to the competitive outcome,
permit exporters receive the rectangle HIK0 as income from permit sales. Hot air exporters
benefit from further supply restrictions as long as the gains from higher prices are greater than
the loss of revenues from a lower level of permits sold. Due to the higher price of permits, an
importing country increases domestic abatement (a) and covers its remaining abatement
requirements to its Kyoto emission target (k) through permit imports (q). Its costs of
compliance increase to the area LMNT.
Figure 1 Effects of supply side restrictions accounting for hot air
The existence of hot air complicates the usual textbook illustration of efficiency losses
emerging from market power in tradable quota markets. In fact, the possibility of selling hot
air changes the environmental effectiveness between the competitive solution vis-à-vis the
non-competitive solution. While – in our case – hot air in competitive markets reduces
environmental effectiveness to zero, supply-side restrictions below Qu imply a real reduction
in emissions. The concise measurement of efficiency loss from market power must then refer
to the same emission abatement. In Figure 1, the triangle IJK visualizes the induced efficiency
loss: The same effective abatement Q emerging from monopolistic supply could have been
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8achieved at lower overall costs in a competitive setting (see index “c” in Figure 1) if the hot
air supplier had also undertaken some real abatement (Qc-Qr). The market price of permits
would then fall to Pc. 
Reference to the same target allows us to abstract from the benefit-side of emission
abatement, which would otherwise require the use of rather uncertain and broad-ranged
estimates for the external cost of GHG emissions. One should be aware that market power in
the presence of negative environmental externalities may increase total welfare (economic
efficiency) in contrast to the competitive solution as long as the loss from non-equalization of
marginal abatement costs is more than offset by the benefits from reduced environmental
damages at the margin.
3. Analytical Framework 
The analysis of non-competitive supply behavior in section 4 below is based on
marginal abatement cost curves for different Annex-B regions (see Appendix A for the
algebraic exposition of the model). These curves represent the marginal cost of reducing
carbon emissions by different amounts within an economy. Marginal costs of abatement may
vary considerably across countries due to differences in carbon intensity, initial energy price
levels, and the ease of carbon substitution possibilities. For the empirical specification of
regional marginal abatement costs curves across regions i, we adopt a constant elasticity
function of the form:
       
i
i i i i i iC e e e e


where C' is the marginal cost of reducing carbon emissions in country i, ie  are the business-
as-usual emissions, ei are the actual emissions, i.e. ai = ie  – ei denotes the level of abatement.
In order to determine the coefficients  and , we employ a least-square procedure based on a
sufficiently large number of discrete observations for marginal abatement costs (or carbon
taxes) and the induced emission reduction in each region. These values are generated by the
world energy system model POLES (Criqui et. al. 1996), which embodies a detailed bottom-
up description of regional energy markets and world-energy trade. Table 2 lists the least-
square estimates for the coefficients of marginal abatement cost curves across regions. 
9Table 2 Coefficients of marginal abatement cost curve approximations
Coefficients AUN CAN EEC EUR FSU JPN USA
 0.675 1.567 0.316 0.114 0.046 0.718 0.020
 1.442 1.379 1.388 1.369 1.482 1.338 1.427
Figure 2 illustrates the implied marginal abatement cost curves for those Annex-B
regions that face binding carbon constraints and are willing to comply with the Kyoto
Protocol. As noted above, this set of region compromises all OECD countries except for the
U.S. The carbon taxes that the different regions would have to impose in order to reach their
Kyoto commitment through strictly domestic action are indicated on the cost curves. We use
the marginal abatement costs curves for the derivation of the aggregate permit demand curve
under the New targets of the Kyoto Protocol. A region will demand permits as long as the
market price of permits is lower than its marginal abatement costs. Conversely, it supplies
permits as long as the market price is above its marginal costs of abatement. The aggregate
demand curve, as depicted by Figure 2, is then obtained by simply adding up the demanded
and supplied quantities of all regions at each market price. If the market price is equal to zero
(as in the case of competitive permit markets), the aggregate demand amounts to 284 MtC,
which is the sum of emission abatement requirements across all non-U.S. OECD regions. As
the price increases, aggregate demand diminishes. When the market price reaches 105
USD/tC, AUN switches from being a permit supplier to being a permit demander, since the
international permit price exceeds its marginal abatement costs associated with purely
domestic compliance to the Kyoto Protocol. The same happens at a price of 117 USD/tC for
EUR. At a price of 131 USD/tC, the amount of permits supplied by AUN (5 MtC) and EUR
(13 MtC) just equals the demand by CAN (4 MtC) and JPN (14 MtC), resulting in an
aggregate demand of zero.
10
Figure 2 Marginal abatement cost curves and aggregate demand
4. Policy Simulations
Throughout the exposition in this section, we refer to Annex-B regions as those
countries of the Annex-B in the Kyoto Protocol that are willing to ratify. This means that the
U.S. is not included unless explicitly specified otherwise. Furthermore, it should be noted that
all our results refer to one target year, namely 2010. 
A. Scenarios
In our simulations, we first consider the case in which Annex-B countries meet their
Kyoto reduction commitment by purely domestic action. Although this scenario is unlikely, it
provides a useful reference point for the potential environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto
Protocol if hot air is suppressed (see scenario COMP-2):
NTR Annex-B countries can trade emission rights as allocated under the Kyoto
Protocol only within domestic borders. This is equivalent to a situation in
which Annex-B countries apply domestic carbon taxes that are high enough to
meet their individual Kyoto commitments. Regions EEC and FSU do not face
direct compliance costs, as their emission targets do not become binding but
won't be able to sell hot air in this case either. 
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Considering international emissions trading, we start with the assumption of perfect
competitive supply and demand behavior:
TRD All Annex-B countries, including FSU and EEC, are allowed to trade
emissions among each other. All regions behave as price takers. There is no
market power exercised in the international permit market.
As has been elaborated in section 3, competitive supply behavior on behalf of FSU is
neither realistic for the case of U.S. compliance nor for the case of U.S. withdrawal: FSU
takes a dominant permit supply position due to its large entitlements with hot air. In the
scenario MONOP, therefore, we assume monopoly power by the FSU:  
MONOP FSU acts as a monopoly whereas all other regions are price takers, i.e. they
minimize their permit trading or abatement costs given the permit price set by
the FSU. EEC is treated as a competitive fringe (price taker) following the
price leadership of the dominant region FSU.11
The scenario COMP-1 is designed to provide information on the efficiency gains from
competitive markets as compared to the monopolistic solution warranting the same
environmental effectiveness:
COMP-1 Marginal abatement costs across all Annex-B regions are equalized given the
overall Annex-B reduction target from scenario MONOP. In this case, the
individual abatements by the various regions are cost-efficient from an overall
point of view.
The final scenario, COMP-2, is the complement to the initial NTR scenario in the
sense that it achieves the same environmental effectiveness under competitive permit trading:
COMP-2 FSU and EEC are only entitled with business-as-usual emissions and no longer
dispose of hot air. The aggregate reduction level for Annex-B regions amounts
to the emission cutback achieved under NTR. Emissions can be fully traded
across regions to assure a cost-efficient outcome.
The label COMP for the last two scenarios indicates that they incorporate monetary
compensation to FSU and EEC up to the revenues from permit sales that occur in the case of
monopolistic FSU supply behavior (scenario MONOP). After compensation of FSU and EEC,
COMP-1 still provides some efficiency gains from competitive markets to allow for a Pareto-
superior solution as compared to the MONOP outcome. COMP-2 delivers information on the
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FSU knows how much EE supplies at any given price and adjusts the residual demand curve accordingly.
12
magnitude and distribution of compliance costs across Annex-B regions if FSU and EEC are
only entitled with their business-as-usual emissions in 2010. Once again, compensation to
FSU and EEC for the MONOP revenues would be required. In a nutshell: The scenario
COMP-2 provides the lowest aggregate costs for non-U.S. OECD countries to achieve the
NTR environmental effectiveness (including monetary compensations to FSU and EEC).
The three final scenarios US-NTR, US-TRD, and US-MONOP consider U.S.
compliance for alternative assumptions on the scope of emissions trading and the underlying
market structure. U.S. compliance is obviously not a realistic policy option given the current
status of climate policy. Yet, these scenarios provide the necessary information on how U.S.
withdrawal (as captured by the preceding scenarios) changes economic costs and
environmental effectiveness vis-à-vis U.S. compliance:
US-NTR All Annex-B regions – including the U.S. - meet their reduction target by
domestic action only.
US-TRD Emission entitlements can be traded on perfectly competitive markets across all
Annex-B regions. 
US-MONOP Emission are freely tradable across all Annex-B regions. FSU exerts monopoly
power on international permit markets. 
B. Results
Table 3 summarizes the economic and environmental effects across all scenarios that
assume non-compliance of the U.S. We begin the interpretation of results for the NTR case.
Without permit trading, each Annex-B country has to meet its reduction target exclusively by
domestic action. The associated marginal abatement costs are listed in Note “c” of Table 3.
Notice that the order in marginal abatement costs across OECD countries does not necessarily
reflect the order of magnitude of percentage reduction requirements. The relative cutback
requirement is only one determinant of marginal and inframarginal12 abatement costs. Other
major factors affecting marginal abatement costs include the energy/carbon intensity of the
respective economies, initial energy prices13, and the ease of carbon substitution in production
and consumption. EEC and FSU do not face any binding abatement requirements. Therefore,
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The areas under the marginal abatement cost curves in Figure 2 reflect the total costs of compliance for the
NTR case as listed in Table 3.
13
their marginal costs of abatement are zero. In absolute terms, compliance costs for OECD
countries sum up to 16.2 bn USD with EUR facing the highest compliance costs. However, if
we adopt a meaningful relative cost measure (here: costs as percentage of projected GDP in
2010), EUR bears by far the smallest abatement burden. Compliance costs are rather small
across OECD countries, ranging from 0.07 % GDP loss for EUR up to 0.2 % for AUN and
CAN. Obviously, the real emission reduction under NTR for Annex-B countries must be equal
to the New effective reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol as listed in Table 1.
Total emission reduction with respect to BaU amounts to 284 MtC or 6.6 % of aggregate BaU
emissions across all Annex-B countries, including the U.S.
Under competitive Annex-B emissions trading (scenario TRD), the permit price equals
zero, since the amount of hot air exceeds the total amount of the emission reduction
requirements. Consequently, the total costs as well as country-specific costs for meeting the
New Kyoto targets without participation of the U.S. are zero. Total gains from trade as
compared to the NTR scenario, hence, amount to 16.2 bn USD, i.e. the total of NTR
compliance costs. However, there is no emission reduction at all with respect to BaU. In
short, Kyoto boils down to business-as-usual; Annex-B emissions in 2010 remain unchanged.
Under monopoly power, FSU reduces the hot air supply to maximize its profits given
the reaction of EEC as a competitive fringe. The monopolistic profit of FSU amounts to 3 bn
USD with a hot air supply of 94 MtC at a market price of 32 USD. The fringe supplier EEC
delivers emission permits of 87 MtC to the market composed of 59 MtC hot air and 35 MtC
from domestic abatement. EEC benefits from implementation of the Kyoto Protocol with a
net revenue of 2.4 bn USD under MONOP. All OECD regions face substantially lower
compliance costs under MONOP as compared to the NTR case, since their NTR marginal
abatement costs are much higher than the monopolistic permit price. As a consequence, it is
much cheaper for OECD countries to reduce their domestic abatement efforts (see rows Real
emission reduction in Table 3) and pay for fictive (in the case of hot air) or effective emission
abatement in FSU and EEC. However, the huge cost reduction under MONOP vis-à-vis NTR
is not only due to cost savings from permit trading but also due to a substantial relaxation of
the overall emission constraint. Environmental effectiveness drops by more than a half from
6.6 % to 3 %. The monopoly case entails efficiency losses because marginal abatement costs
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For example, higher initial energy prices due to prevailing taxes require - ceteris paribus - higher carbon
taxes in order to reach the same relative cutback in energy demand.
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across all Annex-B regions are not equalized. In fact, FSU has marginal abatement costs of
zero and does not abate any real emissions. 
Scenario COMP-1 reveals the efficiency gains from competitive permit trade as
compared to the MONOP case (keeping the same environmental effectiveness). Marginal
abatement costs drop by a half, and total efficiency gains amount to roughly 1 bn USD.
Marginal abatement costs are now equalized across all trading partners, and real emission
reduction in Table 3 indicates the efficient abatement share for each region under overall cost-
effectiveness considerations. With regard to permit trade, emission exports reported for FSU
and EEC now reflect real abatement; the additional row in Table 3, “hot air”, denotes the total
feasible amount of hot air that can be sold by FSU and EEC in the competitive setting. Note,
that this amount is the same as under MONOP, but an overall cost-efficient abatement now
requires a (substantial) cutback of real emissions in FSU. Of course, FSU will only accept the
COMP-1 abatement policy when it is at least fully compensated up to its MONOP profits.
Likewise, approval by OECD countries and EEC implies that no country is worse off as
compared to the MONOP case. Given the gains in overall compliance costs, these
requirements can be met, while nearly one 1 bn USD can additionally be distributed across all
trading partners. It is not appropriate to speculate at this point on a specific distribution
mechanism. 
The results for the final scenario COMP-2 in Table 3 summarize the implications that
would surface if Annex-B countries were to achieve the same total emission reduction as for
the NTR case. Total compliance for OECD countries decreases from 16.2 bn USD to 9.8 bn
USD. As expected, all OECD countries would be better off than under NTR but undergo
higher costs than in the MONOP case. Interestingly, COMP-2 would not require additional
compensation of the FSU; FSU profits slightly more from competitive permit trading under
COMP-2 (i.e. without hot air and NTR environmental effectiveness) than from monopolistic
pricing under MONOP. The reason for this is that the increase in the permit price under
COMP-2 not only compensates FSU for the undertaken domestic abatement, but remaining
profits are even higher than the profits from hot air sales under MONOP. EEC, however, is
worse off, since its revenues from permit trade are not high enough to cover both domestic
abatement costs and the profits occurring in the MONOP case. Hence, EEC must be
considered a candidate for compensation up to its MONOP profits. The question remains
whether OECD countries would accept the overall increase in total costs from 7.2 bn USD to
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11.2 bn USD (including compensating transfers to EEC) and how the distribution of these
costs should look.
Table 3: Summary of results without participation of USA
NTR TRD MONOP COMP-1 COMP-2
Absolute cost of compliance (bn USD)
AUN 1.4 0 0.8 0.4 1.0
CAN 2.0 0 0.8 0.4 1.1
EEC 0 0 -2.4 -1.1 -1.0
EUR 7.8 0 3.9 2.2 5.3
FSU 0 0 -3.0 -2.0 -3.1
JPN 5.0 0 1.7 0.9 2.4
Total 16.2 0 1.8 0.9 5.6
Relative cost of compliance (% of business-as-usual GDP in 2010)
AUN 0.209 0 0.116 0.065 0.154
CAN 0.208 0 0.080 0.043 0.111
EEC 0 0 -0.403 -0.184 -0.174
EUR 0.067 0 0.034 0.019 0.046
FSU 0 0 -0.351 -0.231 -0.363
JPN 0.104 0 0.036 0.019 0.050
Total a 0.083 0 0.009 0.004 0.029
Real emission reduction (% from business-as-usual in 2010)
AUN 25.4 0 11.2 6.9 14.8
CAN 17.6 0 5.4 3.3 7.3
EEC 0 0 13.4 8.1 17.9
EUR 15.2 0 5.9 3.6 8.0
FSU 0 0 0 8.7 18.4
JPN 19.1 0 5.2 3.1 7.0
Total b 6.6 0 3.0 3.0 6.6
Total real emission reduction (MtC)
284 0 130 130 284
Market price (USD/tC)
- c 0 32 16 48
Permit trade (MtC) d
AUN - 0 18 24 14
CAN - 0 20 24 17
EEC - 0 -87 -17 -37
EUR - 0 97 121 77
FSU - 0 -94 -52 -109
JPN - 0 46 53 40
Hot air -153
a Percentage change with respect to business-as-usual GDP of Annex-B in 2010 except for the U.S.
b Percentage change with respect to total Annex-B emissions in 2010 under BaU  including U.S. emissions.
c MAC without trade: 105 USD/tC for AUN, 163 USD/tC for CAN, 117 USD/tC for EUR, 184 USD/tC for JPN.
d Positive values indicate permit imports, negative values indicate permit exports.
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Table 4 completes our analysis of alternative abatement policy scenarios. It provides a
perspective on how U.S. compliance (or, in turn, U.S. withdrawal, if we make the reference to
Table 3) affects environmental effectiveness and the magnitude, as well as the distribution of
compliance costs. For the scenario US-NTR, compliance costs of non-U.S. Annex-B countries
must be the same as under the NTR scenario in our partial analytical framework. In absolute
as well as relative terms, the U.S. bears the highest compliance costs. The importance of U.S.
compliance for international climate policy becomes evident from the implied change in
environmental effectiveness: Real emission reduction of Annex-B countries triples compared
to the NTR case under U.S. withdrawal. Competitive international permit trade under US-TRD
accommodates a major cutback in total compliance costs while the real emission reduction
vis-à-vis business-as-usual amounts still to 10 % (compared to 18.5 % for US-NTR and only
6.6 % for NTR). In contrast to our results for the case of U.S. withdrawal, we see that
monopoly power by FSU has no impact on environmental effectiveness; the aggregate
emission cutback under US-TRD and US-MONOP are the same. The reason is that in both
cases the total amount of permits supplied by FSU (and EEC) exceeds the total stock in hot
air. Given the same environmental impact, we can directly read off the efficiency losses
induced by US-MONOP vis-à-vis US-TRD: Monopolistic supply by FSU drives up the permit
price to 51 USD, which increases compliance costs by 40 % as compared to competitive
permit trading (in which the permit price is only 37 USD).14 
Cross-comparison between scenarios MONOP and US-MONOP indicates that non-
U.S. OECD countries face smaller compliance costs after U.S. withdrawal considering FSU
market power. The reason for this is the fall in the emission permit price implied by a reduced
permit demand after U.S. withdrawal. However, the reduction in compliance costs must be
weighted against a substantial loss in environmental effectiveness (from 10% to 3% emission
reduction). FSU and its competitive fringe EEC face a drastic decline in revenues from permit
sales, since the permit price declines from 51 USD under US-MONOP to 32 USD under
MONOP.
                                                
14
We omit an additional scenario US-COMP (like COMP-1) to identify the efficiency losses from market
power, since the latter would be (almost) identical to the scenario US-TRD.
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Table 4: Summary of results with participation of USA
US-NTR US-TRD US-MONOP
Absolute cost of compliance (bn USD)
AUN 1.4 0.9 1.1
CAN 2.0 0.9 1.1
EEC 0 -2.8 -4.2
EUR 7.8 4.4 5.6
FSU 0 -13.2 -15.6
JPN 5.0 1.9 2.5
USA 30.3 14.5 18.6
Total 46.5 6.5 9.1
Relative cost of compliance (% of business-as-usual GDP in 2010)
AUN 0.209 0.128 0.160
CAN 0.208 0.090 0.117
EEC 0 -0.474 -0.699
EUR 0.067 0.037 0.048
FSU 0 -1.522 -1.803
JPN 0.104 0.040 0.053
USA 0.230 0.110 0.142
Total a 0.142 0.020 0.028
Real emission reduction (% from business-as-usual in 2010)
AUN 25.4 12.3 15.5
CAN 17.6 6.0 7.6
EEC 0 14.8 18.7
EUR 15.2 6.6 8.3
FSU 0 15.4 0.3
JPN 19.1 5.8 7.4
USA 28.0 10.7 13.5
Total b 18.5 10.0 10.0
Total real emission reduction (MtC)
790 429 429
Market price (USD/tC)
- c 37 51
Permit trade (MtC) d
AUN - 17 13
CAN - 19 16
EEC - -90 -98
EUR - 90 72
FSU - -393 -304
JPN - 44 39
USA - 313 262
a Percentage change with respect to business-as-usual GDP of Annex-B in 2010 including the U.S.
b Percentage change with respect to total Annex-B emissions in 2010 under BaU including U.S. emissions.
c Marginal abatement cost in region without trade are 105 USD/tC for AUN, 163 USD/tC for CAN, 117 USD/tC
for EUR, 184 USD/tC for JPN and 145 USD/tC for USA.
d Positive values indicate permit imports, negative values indicate permit exports.
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Figure 3 summarizes the concrete results of our policy simulations. Without U.S.
compliance, the residual demand of competitive OECD countries (all of them facing binding
emission constraints) is given by the curve D. Under competitive permit trading TRD, FSU
supplies hot air in excess of market demand, which results in a market equilibrium at point H.
If the FSU exercises monopoly power (MONOP), it sells hot air permits until the marginal
revenues of permit sales (MR) are equal to the marginal costs of abatement, which are zero in
our case (point I). Monopoly power by the FSU, thus, increases the international permit price,
and initiates real emission reduction. Point J reflects the scenario COMP-1, which achieves
the same emission reduction as under MONOP in a cost efficient way, since cheap reduction
possibilities in FSU are exploited (to a level where marginal abatement costs are equalized
across all regions). With U.S. participation, the residual demand faced by FSU is depicted by
the curve DUS. In this case, the competitive permit market equilibrium (US-TRD) is given by
point K whereas point L captures the situation of FSU monopoly power (US-MONOP). Note
that monopolistic behavior under U.S. participation does not affect environmental
effectiveness, since the optimal monopolistic permit supply by FSU is larger than its amount
of hot air.
Figure 3 Graphical exposition of results
$/t
0
25
50
75
100
125
200 300 400 500 600 700
I
J
L
K
DUS
D MRUS
MR
C'FSU
H
MtC100
19
5. Conclusions
This paper has laid out that the implications of FSU market power on environmental
effectiveness and compliance costs differ substantially when comparing U.S. compliance to
U.S. withdrawal. While exercise of market power on behalf of FSU under U.S. compliance
has no environmental impact as compared to competitive permit trade, it prevents the Kyoto
Protocol from boiling down to business-as-usual after U.S. withdrawal. Efficiency losses from
FSU market power increase considerably (in relative terms) if the U.S. is not going to comply.
U.S. withdrawal reduces the compliance costs of remaining OECD countries costs, but these
gains must be weighed against a dramatic loss in overall environmental effectiveness. Clearly,
the big losers from U.S. withdrawal are FSU and its competitive fringe EEC that suffer from a
huge decline in permit sales revenues.
Sensitivity analysis with respect to alternative baseline projections confirm the
robustness of our qualitative findings, although the concrete quantitative values, particularly
at the single country level, may alter considerably for diverging assumptions on future
economic growth and baseline emissions.15
There are several aspects that warrant further investigation of the issues treated in this
paper. First, our analysis does not cover a further commitment period after 2012, which might
influence the behavior of Parties in the first commitment period, e.g. through strategic
banking of emission permits. Second, we have not considered the possibility of lowering
market power by opening up emission trading to non-Annex B countries via the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM). Third, our analysis is a partial equilibrium approach, since
it does not consider spillover effects of carbon abatement policies or monopolistic pricing to
other markets. For instance, abating countries do not take into account the effects of carbon
reduction efforts on international prices and therefore its terms of trade. It would be
interesting – also from a methodological point of view – to compare the partial equilibrium
results with respective general equilibrium calculations in order to identify and quantify
potential sources of divergence.
                                                
15
For the sake of brevity, we do not report the sensitivity analysis on different baseline projections, i.e. lower or
higher growth and emission projections as compared to our central case provided by DOE (DOE 2001).
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Appendix A: Algebraic model description
This section provides an algebraic summary of the partial equilibrium model for
permit trade underlying the simulations in section 4. We begin with the model formulation for
a competitive system of permit trade without the occurrence of hot air. Second, we show how
hot air can be accounted for. Finally, we lay out the set-up for the case of monopolistic permit
supply.
A1. Competitive permit trading
Under competitive permit trading, all countries i are price takers. Each country
minimizes its compliance costs to some exogenous target level ki. Compliance costs equal the
sum of abatement costs and the costs of buying carbon permits; in the case of permit sales, the
second term becomes negative, which means that the country minimizes the cost of abatement
minus the income from selling permits. Costs are minimized subject to the constraint that a
country meets its exogenous reduction target, in other words: a country's initial endowment of
permits plus the amount of permits bought or sold on the market (qi) may not exceed the
emission target level ki:
 min   
i
i i i iq
C e e P q (1)
. .  i i is t e k q ,
where
Ci denotes the abatement cost function for reducing carbon emissions,
ie stands for the business-as-usual emissions, 
ei are the actual emissions, and 
P is the permit price taken as exogenous. 
The first order condition for the cost minimization problem is given by:
 '  i i iC e e P . (2)
In the optimum, the price taking countries abate emissions up to a level where their marginal
abatement costs (C') equal the permit price. Total costs of reducing emissions to the overall
target level  i
i
K k  are minimized, since all opportunities for exploiting cost differences in
abatement across countries are taken. 
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A.2 Accounting for hot air
A country with hot air (hi) minimizes costs of abatement minus income from selling
permits (qi<0):
 min    
i
i i i i iq
C h e e P q (3)
. .  i i is t e k q .
The amount of hot air equals the difference between the emission target and the business-as-
usual emissions: 
 i i ik h e . (4)
The first order condition yields:
 '   i i i iC h e e P . (5)
The existence of hot air does not change the cost-efficiency property of unrestricted
competitive permit trading since marginal abatement costs are still equalized. However, hot
air sold on the permit market does not imply any effective (real) emission reduction in the hot
air countries. The occurrence of traded hot air, therefore, results in an increase of overall
emission compared to a situation without international permit trade. 
A.3 Monopolistic permit supply
Monopolistic permit supply is characterized as a situation where one country (denoted
“m”) - in our case the hot air country FSU - has supply power in the permit market while all
other countries, denoted as fringe “f”, behave as price takers. The fringe countries, thus,
minimize their compliance costs given the permit price set by the monopolist. They emit
carbon until the marginal costs of abatement equal the permit price:
 'f f f fC h e e P   . (5’)
The aggregate permit demand of the fringe, which is in total a net importer of permits, is:
   F f
f
Q P q P . (6)
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The monopolist sets its permit supply (qm<0) to minimize abatement costs minus income from
permit sales:
 min    
m
m m m m mq
C h e e P q (7)
 
. .  

m m m
F
s t e k q
P P Q
where P is the inverse demand function of the fringe countries. As illustrated in Figure 3, the
first order condition of the cost minimization problem indicates that the monopolist sets
marginal abatement costs equal to marginal revenue:
   ' '    m m m m F mC h e e P P Q q , (8)
Marginal abatement costs are accordingly not equalized between the fringe countries
(Equation 5’) and the monopolist (Equation 8), resulting in overall efficiency losses due to
market power.
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Appendix B: GHG Emission Reduction Targets for Annex-B countries
Labela Original Kyoto Targets (OLD)b
(% of 1990 GHG emissions)
Revised Targets (NEW)c
(% of 1990 GHG emissions)
Australia  AUN 108 110.7
Austria      EUR 87 92.9
Belgium EUR 92.5 93.8
Bulgaria     EEC 92 95.2
Canada CAN 94 107.9
Croatia EEC 95 95
Czech Republic   EEC 92 94.1
Denmark EUR 79 81.1
Estonia      FSU 92 94.7
Finland      EUR 100 107.8
France    EUR 100 103.9
Germany EUR 79 80.7
Greece EUR 125 133.1
Hungary EEC 94 97.8
Iceland EUR 110 118
Ireland     EUR 113 116.2
Italy      EUR 93.5 95.3
Japan      JPN 94 99.2
Latvia     FSU 92 98
Liechtenstein    EUR 92 107.9
Lithuania      EUR 92 96.5
Luxembourg     EUR 72 79.6
Monaco      EUR 92 93
Netherlands     EUR 94 95.2
New Zealand AUN 100 107
Norway      EUR 101 105.3
Poland     EEC 94 96.5
Portugal      EUR 127 130.7
Romania EEC 92 96.2
Russian Federation FSU 100 105.7
Slovakia    EEC 92 96.3
Slovenia     EEC 92 100.4
Spain    EUR 115 118.9
Sweden      EUR 104 109.5
Switzerland     EUR 92 96.6
Ukraine      FSU 100 102.4
United Kingdom   EUR 87.5 88.8
United States    USA 93 96.8
a Label of aggregate model region which includes the respective Annex-B country
b UNFCCC (1997)
c Estimates by the European Commission accounting for sink credits based on UNFCCC (2001)
